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With regard to the science which is the subject of our inquiry, we must first state the problems 
which should be discussed first. (995a24-25) 
 
Opening treatise Beta, we are opened onto that which remains concealed as a result of our regimes of 
relevance, our steadfast concerns, our habits of inquiry. “With [the] regard [that opens us] to the science which 
is the subject of our inquiry,” that is, with the regard that opens beyond our regional concerns onto the science 
of wisdom, we are opened at once beyond ourselves and onto ourselves; for, it is the broadening of the scope 
of  our  concern  that  enframes  our  more  habitual  inquiries  and  interests  in  such  a  way  that  they  become 
available in their narrowness. We are both ek-statically projected beyond our habitual limits and returned to 
what is most proximate. “With regard
1 to the science which is the subject of our inquiry,” we will learn that it 
is precisely the modes of our concern with the beings that proximally and for the most part concern us that 
conceals “the problems which should be discussed first” if we desire to know in the highest degree, if we seek 
the  ultimate  telos  (the  good  without  qualification),  if  we  seek  the  science  of  wisdom.  The  problems  that 
regularly  organize  our  methods  of  inquiry  and  the  interests  they  express,  then,  are  themselves  rendered 
problematic, even uncanny, by this regard, this unsettling gaze attuned to the science of wisdom.  
That  through  which  we  become  aware  that  “we  must  first  state  the  problems  which  should  be 
discussed first” is the regard responding to and organized by “the science which is the subject of our inquiry.” 
“With regard to the science which is the subject of our inquiry,” with a broadly circumspective regard, with a 
gaze expansive enough to encompass previous modes of concern and in this encompassing redirect attention 
toward the science of wisdom such that we can hope to discern the order of that science (the order that allows 
one to “first state the problems which should be discussed first”), the order of the cosmos that science discloses, 
and the situatedness, relationality, or positioning of ourselves as inquiring beings within that cosmos (whereby 
our gaze turns back upon and envelops us), we surely are attuned elsewhere and otherwise, but that does not 
mean that we become oblivious to or ignore our various regional concerns. Rather, acceding proleptically to 
the science of wisdom and thus attending to these habitual concerns in their regionality, in their inability to 
disclose the why of beings to the highest degree, we are afforded the opportunity to investigate other modalities 
                                                 
    
1 Here it may be useful to heed the resonance of  pros (with regard) in its configurations as pros-agoreuo (to 
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of  emergence  of  the  beings  we  find  ourselves  concerned  with  in  our  habitual  modes  of  inquiry  and  to 
investigate ourselves as prone to concern ourselves with beings in the manners that have become habitual. 
Attending to that which exceeds and contains the human and its regional concerns, we are offered anew that 
which is most intimate: both the objects of our concerns and ourselves as concerned beings. Spanning beyond 
and rounding back, the regard that opens us onto the science of wisdom is both unsettling and itself unsettled, 
a kinetic force, as if a matter of physis. 
Gathering and consolidating our focus into the “regard [directed toward] . . . the science which is the 
subject of our inquiry,” it seems as if Aristotle paradoxically opens our inquiry into the science of wisdom by 
declaring  the  necessity  [anagke]  of  having  already  undertaken  such  an  inquiry.  For  it  seems  that  only  a 
retrospective gaze, an experienced gaze already aware of what problems should be stated and discussed first, 
can “regard . . . the science which is the subject of our inquiry . . .  [and] first state the problems which should 
be discussed first.” As if returning from the end of an inquiry into “the science which is the subject of our 
inquiry,” Aristotle enticingly yet vexingly inveighs us to “state the problems [aporias] that should be discussed 
first,” thereby posturing as if he is already able to discern such an order, as if he had already stated certain 
problems (perhaps those which we will state and discuss in the ensuing paragraphs, perhaps others), inquired 
into them to the greatest possible degree, determined which are the most fecund and which lead astray, and is 
thus in a position to tell us which problems (aporias) must be stated and discussed first.
2 In the name of the 
science of wisdom,
3 Aristotle, speaking as a privileged representative of this science, as if initiated and thus able 
to direct us, perhaps so well initiated as to direct us through the process(es)  necessitated by the science we are 
opening onto, conveys its injunction (thus, in an extremely complicated gesture, assimilating its authority) that 
“we first state the problems that should be discussed first.”  
Unless  we  are  to  concede  that  Aristotle,  in  an  uncharacteristically  self-assertive  and  authoritarian 
manner, simply  posits the necessity of stating first the problems which should be discussed first and then, 
audaciously,  continues  Beta  One  by  stating  and  discussing  what  we  must, on  the  ground  of  their  site  of 
enunciation (i.e., Aristotle’s authority), deem necessary problems, it seems  best to situate the force  of the 
normative injunction (“we must first state the problems which should be discussed first”) as arising from, or at 
least professing to arrive from, a cultivated responsiveness to the science of wisdom and/or that which is 
disclosed therein. If we accept this interpretive hypothesis, in asking that we “first state the problems which 
should be discussed first,” Aristotle does not expect us, who are at best incipiently emerging from the habitual 
hold of our regional concerns, to have even a vague inkling of the contours and order of such aporias or any 
great aptitude to discuss them well. Rather, it seems a great deal more plausible that we who are only initiating 
                                                 
    
2 If we are to believe that only upon return from the completion of inquiry into the science of wisdom can 
one demand that problems are stated first that should be discussed first, and so if we are to conclude from this 
injunction that Aristotle is, or at least believes himself to be, returning from the culminating apex of insight into 
the science of wisdom, we would have to wonder what it is about the achievement of i nsight to the highest 
degree into the science of wisdom that sends him back? Why does Aristotle not rest content, reposing in a 
paroxysm of contemplative fulfillment? 
    
3 Whereas pros theon may be rendered as “in the name of the divinities,” pros tan  . . . epistemen may be 
rendered as “in the name of the science.” Glossator, Volume 1, Fall 2009                                                                                                                         glossator.org 
 
ISSN 1942-3381                                                              Adam Rosen 
 
131 
this inquiry are expected to “state the problems which should be discussed first” precisely by “stating” them 
along with Aristotle, by assenting to Aristotle’s determination of these problems, at least for the time being, and 
by  accepting  Aristotle  as  a  guide  who  will  direct  our  ventures  into  the  science  of  wisdom.
4  A troubling 
condition for thoroughgoing (self-)inquiry, Aristotle seems to suggest, is acceding to the perhaps irredeemable 
authority of inheritance, to the risk of receptivity.  
To be sure, although Aristotle implores us to “state the problems which should be discussed first” as if 
what is stated and discussed first is a necessary prerequisite for the attainment of a predetermined end, this end 
to which we (are lead to) aspire is not necessarily the exhaustive finality of inquiry. Nor is it necessary that we 
think the end to come, the end in view of which it is necessary that we state and discuss certain aporias first, as 
a systematically organized set of contents that constitute “the science of wisdom”—at the very least, that would 
risk the grossest anachronism. It is not incidental that what is necessary is that we state and discuss aporias first. 
Regardless of how well these aporias are determined and discussed, perhaps they remain aporias none the 
less.
5  Perhaps what is at stake is less a methodological ly regulated path to a predetermined end than an 
“ethical” reorientation, a concomitant change in the character of the inquirer and the inquiry. Furthermore, 
whether  the  discussion  of  aporias  is  confined  to  treatise  Beta  or  in  a  way  constitutes  the  entirety  of  The 
Metaphysics is extremely difficult to say, especially since it is yet quite unclear what constitutes a “discussion” of 
aporias
6 and thus quite unclear what would constitute the end of such a discussion.  
Attending to the polysemic range of the dictate to “first state the problems which should be discussed first,” it is 
quite indeterminate exactly what it would mean to discuss first the aporias laid down by Aristotle—especially 
since this call to order does not develop into a remarkably ordered discussion. The injunction may dictate 
something like ongoing, recursive inquiry: the discussion of aporias would be the first discussion of a great 
many, perhaps indefinitely many discussions required for a proper investigation of the science of wisdom, in 
which case such stating and discussing would be merely, however foundationally, first. In this case, the end of 
our inquiry, the trajectory from what is most known to us to what is most known according to itself, may be 
quite far from the stasis of investigative exhaustion. Insofar as the discussion remains concerned with aporias, it 
may remain, in principle, interminable.
7 On the other hand, the injunction to “first state the problems which 
                                                 
    
4 Regardless of whether we are inceptively emerging from the hold of our regional concerns or we are 
experienced thinkers attuned in various ways to the question of being qua being, whether we are still for the 
most part held fast by our regularized interests and inquiries or initiated into the science of wisdom in our own 
ways, we would still do well to accede to Aristotle’s determination and discussion of these aporias in order to 
inquire into the necessity to which they are said to respond. 
    
5 What it is to remain an aporia will be discussed below. 
    
6  Would this entail a dissolution of the aporias, a discerning of those questions that do not admit of 
thorough dissolution and those which do, a reflection that gives rise to another way of proceeding—a way that 
detours around the aporias, a listing and/or brief overview of certain aporias, a sustained engagement with the 
unsurpassability of the aporetic, a traversal of the aporia as such, some combination of the aforementioned 
possibilities, or something else altogether? 
    
7 Of course, the variegated destines of the various aporias require a great deal of further attention. This 
paper only seeks to pave the way for such investigations. While some of the aporias formulated in Beta One Glossator, Volume 1, Fall 2009                                                                                                                         glossator.org 
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should be discussed first” may be understood as requiring us to engage in a discussion of a finite set of aporias 
in order to move on along a prescribed path to the peaks of insight. This is as yet undecided. 
Crucially,  the  question  of  whether  Aristotle’s  formulations  and  discussions  of  these  aporias  are 
necessitated by the science of wisdom would only be decidable, if at all, after we have tarried along the path he 
paves for us, only, if at all, after we too are able to respond to the science of wisdom and the cosmos it discloses 
as they are opened by the initial problems posed and the subsequent discussions and developments of those 
problems. The venture of Aristotle’s discourse would be that only by proceeding in the manner that he lays 
forth could we either experience or fail to experience the retrospective necessity of the problems posed and the 
ensuing discussions. Only after we have followed Aristotle along the paths paved by the questions posed, only 
after we have become open to the phenomena investigated as well as the mode of their investigation, only then, 
if at all, may we undergo the failures or successes attendant thereto and on that basis decide upon the propriety 
of the initial claim too necessity. But it may (also) be that only having inquired along with Aristotle may we 
attain a more cultivated sense for the problematics incumbent to the science of wisdom and only then find 
ourselves in a position to re-begin with other problematics that we feel compelled to state and discuss first. If 
indeed we are as neophyte as the text suggests, then the condition for exceeding Aristotle’s authority, the 
condition for beginning and/or proceeding otherwise, is to initially accede to Aristotle’s trajectory such that it 
leads us to our own grounds for saying otherwise, to our own experience of the necessity of posing problems 
otherwise and/or engaging in discussions in a manner divergent from Aristotle’s. For the meantime, in stating 
and discussing these problems as the ones which should be stated first, in accepting Aristotle as our guide, we 
ratify  a  normative  orientation  for  our  inquiry—already  redoubling  and  thereby  subverting  its  authority. 
Embracing the necessity of an initial ground-laying, we are saved from the vertiginous experience of inquiry 
without determinacy of direction. We thus acknowledge our utter dependence upon guides and grounds, upon 
previous thought and thinkers as a condition for inquiry, for thinking at all.  
 
They are concerned with matters about which some thinkers expressed different beliefs, and 
besides them, with some other matters which may happen to have been overlooked. (995a25-
26) 
 
As noted, the determinations of the aporias are not quite our own; we are to accept those laid down by 
Aristotle as provisionally, however necessarily, appropriate. But after following the paths of inquiry paved by 
Aristotle,  we  too  may  become  “concerned  with  matters  about  which  some  thinkers  [namely,  Aristotle] 
expressed  different  beliefs,  and  besides  them,  with  some  other  matters  which  may  happen  to  have  been 
overlooked.” We  may  confirm  the  necessity  to  “first  state  the  problems  which  should  be discussed  first” 
                                                                                                                                                                         
are maintained in their original form as they are thought through later, others are significantly reformulated. It 
is thus incumbent upon us, if we are to explore the paths opened herein, to inquire into how and why these 
reformulations occur within the respective contexts of their elaborations. Further, if we are to pursue the 
trajectory broached herein, we will have to inquire into why some of the aporias laid out in Beta One later 
receive what may be called decisive treatment—even answers—while others are handled in a manner that more 
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precisely by reserving the prerogative to disagree with the propriety of Aristotle’s specific determination and 
discussion  of  these  problems.  Aristotle’s  seeming  didacticism  paradoxically  opens  the  way  to  a  critical 
contestation of his teachings. If the telos of physis as such— if there is one—does not guarantee for anthropoi a 
linear progress toward wisdom, if some matters perhaps crucial for the inquiry into the science of wisdom may 
have been contingently overlooked (“may happen to have been overlooked”) by our predecessors, it may be 
that Aristotle too contingently overlooks certain matters imperative for the inquiry into the science of wisdom. 
This is what his discourse gives to be seen, however dimly. Aristotle’s (assimilated) authority is dislocated from 
the other side as it relays to (is re-assimilated by) his addressees. More precisely, Aristotle’s authority manifests 
an uncanny structure: self-undermining yet persistent, it is a condition of its own transgression and so abides in 
what claims to exceed it. 
Since it is undecidable from here whether or not various matters will have been overlooked, that is, 
precisely because the aporias which will be discussed first may have been taken up by previous thinkers in ways 
that are inaccessible to or misconstrued by our particular modes of inquiry as much as they “may happen to 
have been overlooked,”
8 and since regardless of whether or not such matters have been considered previously, 
contingent overlooking seems to remain an inevitable danger, we are bound to return, perhaps interminably, to 
the formulation and discussion of the initial aporias that structure our inquiry into the science of wisdom. The 
science of wisdom is perhaps a radically inceptive project—projecting us into a future of inquiry illimitable in 
principle. And even were we to later confirm the necessity of Aristotle’s formulation and discussion of the 
guiding aporias, this necessity would only be confirmed or denied from the perspective of an inquiry emerging 
from Aristotle’s initial statement and discussion of the aporias, the statement and/or discussion of which may 
inevitably, Aristotle intimates, simply overlook some crucial matters and may, in bringing certain problems 
into fine relief, concomitantly conceal others, which means that even then the inquiry may not rightly come to 
a rest.  
Investigations that begin with aporias may remain irremediably partial and provisional, but this is not to 
say without ends at all.
9 Rather, it is to say that perhaps our ends are always responsive to our beginnings —
beginnings formulated without the (perhaps ends-constitutive) knowledge acquired as we move toward our 
investigative ends, even if formulated in view of them, and thus perhaps perpetually in need of reformulation. 
We must then heed the formulation of initial aporias with the utmost attention, which may mean returning to 
them time and again in order to acknowledge the incessant task of the inquiry into the science of wisdom, the 
inquiry that by necessity begins with the stating and discussing of aporias. How far the determination of necessity 
seems to have drifted . . . 
However, proceeding, let alone returning, will not be easy. This inquiry will likely provoke resistance 
insofar as we will be dealing with matters that “may happen to have been overlooked,” that is, with matters 
that may be more or less, perhaps even thoroughly, unfamiliar. Seeking wisdom, of necessity we run headlong 
into the depths of obscurity. If the matters into which we investigate are rather distant from the themes that 
                                                 
    
8 Notice the effort to attune us to opacity and obscurity as perhaps irreducible  dimensions of insight, as 
shadows forever clouding the transparency of knowledge yet perhaps themselves knowable to some degree. 
    
9 Although “no one would try to do anything if [s/]he did not intend to come to a limit,” the limit is not 
necessarily identical with an exhaustive stasis (994b14-15). Glossator, Volume 1, Fall 2009                                                                                                                         glossator.org 
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tend to dominate our concern, matters with respect to which we may have little or no footing, the vertiginous 
sense of beginning an inquiry without any known way of proceeding may generate quite some resistance, 
leading to the denial, trivialization, or facile mischaracterization of the problems rather than more serious 
confrontations  with  them.
10  Or  so  Aristotle  intimates  and  the  history  of  commentary  on  Beta  One 
symptomatically corroborates. Thus without Aristotle’s determination and discussion of the initial aporias, the 
starting point of inquiry may be experienced as abyssal, paralyzing rather than aporetic. Moreover, in that we 
will be “concerned with matters about which some thinkers expressed different beliefs,” we will be taking a 
stand against the sedimented authority of doxa; and so, out of reverence for certain thinkers or commitments 
to particular thoughts, we may again find ourselves resisting.
11 “Concerned with matters about which some 
thinkers expressed different beliefs,” thus with matters that are familiar but taken up in unfamiliar ways, we 
will be engaged in an inquiry that we are told in advance will be contestatory vis-à-vis received opinion, and as 
such, likely to evoke some measure of resistance. Were it not for Aristotle’s claim to proceed via necessity, 
were it not for the channeling of our desire to know and our pleasure in having seen into the search for 
wisdom to the highest degree, that is to say, without the seductive allure of Aristotle’s initial posture, what we 
called his seeming didacticism, we may not have the courage to proceed at all.  
Gathered around the formulation and discussion of aporias, we are gathered into a community, a 
community of (self-)inquiry bound inexorably to no particulars of time or place. Though perhaps illimitable, 
such a community is not without criteria for participation. We are convoked to this community in virtue of a 
willingness to think with and against received opinion (and by implication, a willingness to work through the 
resistances this may provoke at various stages of inquiry). We are not gathered as a community of the purely 
contestatory, as if this were possible; this is no matter of negative self-identification or mere contentiousness. 
Our  community  is  less  an-archic  than  para-doxical.  We  begin  with  differences,  with  the  possibility  of 
resistances, with the abiding yet unsettled authority of received problematics and opinions, but we begin, even 
so, with guides and grounds because we begin in dialogue with our predecessors. And because we begin under 
the tutelage of Aristotle: in order to proceed, we will have embraced Aristotle’s initial determination of “the 
problems which should be discussed first,” etc.  
                                                 
    
10 Precisely what such a “serious” confrontation may be remains a question to be explored throughout this 
paper. 
    
11 Compounding our difficulties, our concern “with matters about which some thinkers expressed different 
beliefs” may generate resistance from the opposite angle. Concerning ourselves with the diversity of opinions 
about matters of common concern, we will come to see that the seemingly established authority of doxa is 
never  free  from  critical  contestation,  never  beyond  reproach.  Exposed  to  the  intervallic  periodicity  of 
established opinion and the ongoing dislocations of settled authority that subtend it, exposed to what may be 
the irreducibility of interpretive plurality about certain matters of ongoing interest, we may find ourselves 
strangely unsettled, resisting what seems to be the hounding out of authority from its historically established 
haunts  or  what  we  anticipatorily  construe  as  the  paralyzing  effects  of  skepticism  induced  by  a  resolutely 
historical perspective. That is, resistances may arise out of piety as much as out of fear of the dissipation of the 
sort of authority that can command piety. Glossator, Volume 1, Fall 2009                                                                                                                         glossator.org 
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We  are  gathered  as  a  community  of  (self-)inquiry  in  virtue  having  undergone  an  antecedent 
solicitation, in virtue of having been exposed to an unsettling force—one name or variant of which might be 
wonder, but in all cases it is a question of eros—to which we feel compelled— yet ill-equipped—to respond. The 
community  in  question  is  marked  by  a  common  compulsion  to  thoughtfully,  inquisitively  respond  to 
something moving, affectively significant, inspiring, something demanding that the exhalation subsequent to 
this in-spiration is overfull with logoi that seek a responsiveness to the science of wisdom as much as possible.
12 
Such a community, then, however illimitable, is hardly amorphous. Now, whether this in-spiration issues from 
Aristotle’s didactic authority, from his proximity to what Lacanians would call the sujet supposé savoir, from a 
proleptic experience of the science of wisdom, or from the authority Aristotle assimilates and channels from the 
genuine successes of his investigations, remains to be determined. For now all we can say is that, thus gathered, 
we can confirm the necessity— in this case the affective necessity, the necessity of passionate compulsion—to 
state the aporias that should be discussed first (whatever they may be). As those tantalized by the prospects of 
wisdom to the highest degree (or its harbinger), as those desiring the pleasure of having seen to the greatest 
extent (or captivated by the bearer of the promise thereof), as those willing to stand out from the accepted 
positions of the communities in which we find ourselves,
13 we gather as the community of the aporia. It is 
perhaps only a community  of the aporia that can be opened to an inquiry into the science of wisdom in its 
fullest, non-exhaustive dimension.  Perhaps a reorientation of character—the ethical dimension—is a condition of 
insight here as elsewhere. 
 
Now those who wish to succeed well in arriving at answers will find it profitable to go over the 
difficulties  well;  for  answers  successfully  arrived  at  are  the  solutions  to  difficulties  previously 
discussed, and one cannot untie a knot if [s/]he is ignorant of it. (995a27-30) 
 
Calling attention to “those who wish to succeed well in arriving at answers,” Aristotle concerns himself with 
appetitive structure as it bears on the ethos of inquiry. Aristotle is here concerned with those who wish to 
“succeed well,” that is, with ethos, character, and what gratifies. Of course, those to whom Aristotle refers may 
be inquirers who wish to bring their inquiring to a close, those who wish to repose in necessarily complete 
insight. But they also may be those who pursue the science of wisdom not simply out of a desire for answers as 
static  finalities.  Perhaps  “those  who  wish  to  succeed  well  in  arriving  at  answers”  are  not  those  who 
wholeheartedly desire the utter dissolution of aporias, the stillness of what once provoked and challenged, the 
exhaustion of striving, but rather those who desire another type of answer altogether: answers well arrived at. 
Over  against  those who only  “wish  to  succeed  .  .  .  [by]  arriving  at  answers,”  say,  in order  to bring  the 
difficulties of inquiry to an end, over against those for whom the desire to bask in the accomplishment of full 
and final comprehension dominates so strongly that it promotes a self-subverting readiness to rest content with 
less  than  might  be  possible  to  achieve,  there  are  perhaps  “those  who  wish  to  succeed  well  in  arriving  at 
answers.”  These  would  be  inquirers  for  whom  what  is  at  stake  is  their  character  upon  arriving  and  the 
                                                 
    
12 Cf. Physics 253a12-14: “the cause of . . . motion is not the animal itself [at least not in an unqualified sense] 
but perhaps its environment.” 
    
13 Treatise Alpha has already established that this will be the case—at least for the most part. Glossator, Volume 1, Fall 2009                                                                                                                         glossator.org 
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character of their arrival, those for whom it is crucial that the provocation to inquiry is preserved, the initiating 
state of exposure is sustained in the experience of arriving. These would be inquirers who, no less enamored with 
the science of wisdom than those seeking contemplative completion—perhaps even more so—are, precisely in 
virtue  of  this  desire,  interested  in  the  experience  of  arriving  as  in  certain  respects  indistinguishable  from 
sending. These would be lovers of the practice of inquiry, those who “love to have seen” [eidenai] both for its 
own sake and insofar as having seen, having made discriminations and determinations, generates refinements 
that allow for further differences to come into view, for further opportunities “to have seen,” perchance for 
development. These inquirers would no doubt be eminently interested in the yield of their various regional 
inquiries, but their desires would not be rigidly attracted thereto, nor would they be monofocally set on the 
systematic  integration  of  insights  attained  from  regional  investigations  as  if  system  and  knowledge  to  the 
highest degree were simply one. Rather, these investigators may be lovers of the prospect of knowledge to the 
highest degree to such an exorbitant extent that they would be willing to consider knowledge attained as partial 
and provisional, as ever in need of refinement, if only to keep on their horizon the possibility of knowledge to 
an even greater degree.
14 A curious madness indeed.  
To be sure, these two appetitive structures are not entirely incompatible. Perhaps the desire for and 
pleasure in the practice of inquiry as such, the desire for continual differentia tion, specification, and openness 
to that which—putatively—remains forever on the horizon, can be the periodic effect of pursuing an inquiry 
predominantly  organized  by  a  desire  for  answers  in  the  sense  of  a  culminating  terminus.  Perhaps  the 
transformation of desire, the generation of an ethos of incessant openness from out of a desire for totality, and 
this in the service of the science of wisdom, is, in part, the venture of The Metaphysics.
15 If so, the project would 
be, in principle, resistant to completion. And if so, if one of the essential movements of  The Metaphysics is a to-
and-fro between a urge to totalization and an interest in what stands apart, what remains abrasively particular 
and/or persistently opaque, perhaps the nature of dialectics needs to be reconsidered in its wake.  
Perhaps, like those undertaking an effort geared to epistemic mastery, the latter sort of inquirers also 
“wish to . . .arriv[e] at answers,” but are more circumspect about this desire. Perhaps, like those fixated upon 
the attainment of terminal conclusions, these inquirers “wish to . . . arriv[e] at answers,” but do not allow this 
wish  to  overwhelm  their  “wish  to  succeed  well”  in  arriving,  do  not  allow  this  interest  to  deaden  their 
receptivity to it potentially detrimental impact on its own fulfillment as well as to other goods. Perhaps these 
latter have come to believe—perhaps they have been lead to believe—that the only way to successfully arrive, to 
arrive  well,  is  to  remain open  to,  and  sometimes  this  means  vigilantly,  willfully  keeping  open,  questions  of 
whether or not one has actually arrived and how one can arrive more successfully. Arriving well, for such 
inquirers, may involve re-traversing ground well covered, and not only in this respect would it be hardly the 
                                                 
    
14 Here we see again how the regard directed beyond, the interest in transcendence, is itself manifest in the 
investigative return to what is familiar, how the pursuit of transcendence and the adventures of immanence are 
one. 
    
15 More on this thought below. Glossator, Volume 1, Fall 2009                                                                                                                         glossator.org 
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contrary of the experience of aporia.
16 “Those who wish to succeed well in arriving at answers,” then, “will 
find it profitable to go over the difficulties [aporias] well.” And if “to go over the aporias well” is an in principle 
interminable  pursuit,  if  such  an  endeavor  requires  sustaining  exposure  to  the  interruptive  and  at  times 
subversive efficacy of aporias, to the ongoing perplexities they induce, as much as to the ways they can be 
gotten around or worked through (e.g., specified, reformulated, partially resolved, mined for various resources) 
and the knowledge yielded thereby, if this “going over,” in order to be done well, may be a simple glancing 
over as much as it may be an incessant retraversing (returning again and again to the initial formulation of the 
aporias so as to generate new and, hopefully, ever more refined lines of inquiry), what it is to arrive well seems, 
though not altogether unclear, radically underdetermined.  
If the “solution to difficulties [aporias] previously discussed” is not the final resolution of the aporias, the 
dissolution of all disquietude, if we are still unclear what constitutes an adequate discussion of aporias (might 
this vary substantially from case to case?) and therefore remain uncertain whether or not we have attained to 
successful solutions insofar as “answers successfully arrived at are the solutions to the difficulties previously 
discussed,” then it seems that, again, we must keep open (to) the question of whether or not we have actually 
arrived and how we can arrive more successfully. Although “one cannot untie a knot if [s/]he is ignorant of it,” 
and so one must push toward the utmost specification of the problems at hand, it is as yet unclear, and perhaps 
will remain so, whether this analogy implies that the unbinding of the knot entails its successful (dis-)solution 
or rather requires the re-solve to confront the further problem of the threads constitutive of the knot as bound 
in their own way. With Aristotle as our guide, we encounter aporias again and again, as if there were nothing 
else.   
Yet, as was noted earlier, Aristotle insists that we would not engage in any activity whatsoever if we 
did not intend to arrive at a limit. But perhaps a viable end is a provisional end, an end pervaded by the 
possibility of continuing otherwise: a self-surpassing end, but an end none the less. If the telos of all but the 
utterly simple is never exhaustive insofar as it is the actualization (energia naming a certain being-at-work, a 
continuity of directed motion) of a being that remains pervaded by potentiality, if teleological orientation 
(entelekia) names the prospective directedness of a process, the anticipated end in view of which the process 
takes upon a determinate shape and thus becomes knowable, then we must reconsider the way “telos” tends to 
resound with a sense of exhaustion and insurpassability. If, phenomenologically, an end is situated within a 
whole that exceeds it such that its status as an end does not exhaust its discernable operations within the whole, 
then an end  is not in all registers identical with a final determination. If actuality precedes possibility for 
Aristotle such that the claim that we would not do things if we did not intend to arrive at a limit corresponds to 
a phenomenological perception of actions always arriving at ends within physis, this is quite different from 
claiming that actions necessarily arrive at exhaustive ends. Consequently, perhaps “to succeed well in arriving 
at answers” is not necessarily to succeed at the stopping point of inquiry beyond which nothing else can be 
                                                 
    
16 Also, if arriving well implies re -traversing ground well covered, then the indistinguishability of arriving 
well from a stale, repetitive, obstinate going over of the same raises the specter of  a madness from which the 
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known,  beyond  which  no  further  determinations,  differentiations,  or  qualifications  are  possible.  Rather, 
answers may be contextually provisional—responsive to their beginnings and the interests borne thereby—and 
nonetheless ends. If there can be no full and final solution to a difficulty but only further inroads to exploring the 
depths of the problem [aporia] and those it branches off into, then a successful arrival at a solution is a non-
arrival at investigative exhaustion. In a curious sense, the inquiry into the science of wisdom seems self-moving 
. . . 
But what of the hierarchies established and ends posited by Aristotle throughout this inquiry? Are 
these to be understood as provisional and contextually relevant, that is, as hierarchies and determinations 
located in an in principle perfectible if interminable inquiry? Or are they responsive to a necessity that dictates 
a singular path toward knowledge in the highest degree from which deviation would amount to failure? Are 
the hierarchies (of the sciences, etc.) and conclusions of the various lines of investigation unsurpassable and 
irreplaceable within the inquiry into the science of wisdom or are they, precisely as elements of an inquiry into 
the science of wisdom that must begin with the statement and discussion of aporias, provisional and strategic 
resting points? Might these hierarchies and conclusions be conditioned by the (im)propriety of the specific 
inquiry that proceeds to their determinations? If so, what would guarantee their necessity?  
Could it be that the various ends and hierarchies are elements of a strategy designed to mitigate the 
force of the various resistances that this particular inquiry risks eliciting? Again, might Aristotle be interested in 
putting a given desire for determinate ends, for hierarchies, generally, for the satisfactions of investigative 
conclusion, in the service of a project that may be, in principle, illimitable? If so, what would this tell us about 
the nature of the end of his pursuit? If these ends and hierarchies are in the service of advancing an inquiry 
that, if successful, would allow the inquirers following Aristotle’s trajectory to return to the beginning of the 
inquiry in order to state the aporias which must be discussed first in a manner divergent from Aristotle’s, if 
Aristotle understands the success of the inquiry in terms of cultivating the capacity to inquire in a manner other 
than, though hopefully building on, his own (that is, in terms of cultivating an openness to the emergence of 
phenomenon  on  the  basis  of  an  emphatic  plurality  of  perspectives  that  would  open  the  chance  for  the 
shortcomings of his investigations to be surpassed by its inheritors), then his push for the determinacy of 
conclusions to the highest degree, the thrust toward the hierarchization of the sciences, the systematic ruling 
out of infinite regresses, the decision that the best explanation is the one with the least number of premises, the 
expulsion of any unnecessary complexity, and so forth may be strategies to generate a taste for specification to 
the highest degree amongst those who follow him and therewith to induce the desire to attain an even greater 
degree of specification than his inquiry offers. To seek the utmost specificity while keeping an eye on the 
conditions from which this determinacy emerges (our premises, previous arguments, structural limitations, etc.) 
generates an historicization of our account (logos), reminds our logos of its origins, and thereby works against a 
fully originary or finalizing (thus perhaps unnecessarily abridged) discourse while at once working toward 
determinacy to the highest degree. If the success of an answer depends on the interpretation of what it is to 
arrive at a solution to difficulties posed and discussed, so long as we remain without secure ground for such an 
interpretation, our criterion for success remains indefinitely in question.  
Perhaps, then, crucial to the successful performance of Aristotle’s inquiries is the cultivation in his 
addressees of a desire for knowledge in the highest degree, a desire which may be actualized as an ethos of 
incessant, recursive inquiry. Perhaps Aristotle attempts to hierarchize, to specify, to rule out infinite regresses Glossator, Volume 1, Fall 2009                                                                                                                         glossator.org 
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and superfluous concerns, and so forth out of an insistently ethical concern, out of a desire to cultivate a habit 
for or ethos of specification—and so to open us toward the potential need to undermine the hierarchies and 
determinacies he establishes along the path of inquiry he lays forth. Although Aristotle may not untie all of the 
knots emergent in the course of our inquiry, it still remains the case that “one cannot untie a knot if [s/]he is 
ignorant of it,” and this guided inquiry at least allows for some familiarity with a great many of these knots and 
may  even  motivate  us  and  provide  some  of  the  resources  to  detect  knots  indiscernible  within  Aristotle’s 
account. For, to some extent, it is the desire for specificity that can eventually lead those who provisionally 
accept Aristotle’s trajectory of inquiry to inquire otherwise. Thus it may be that The Metaphysics is formally self-
undermining,  potentially  destructive  of  all  its  determinations,  and  as  such,  thoroughly  committed  to  an 
investigation of the science of wisdom that seeks knowledge to the highest degree. Indeed, it may even be that 
the striving for knowledge to the highest degree demands the self-undermining of each and every singular 
discourse; perhaps there is an essential connection between wisdom and plurality. Aristotle’s investigations into 
the science of wisdom, in determining that to which we may respond, in cultivating our response-abilities, in 
generating a habit and ethos of openness along with a concern for specification to the highest degree, may be 
thought, then, as an ethical project par excellence.  
“Find[ing] it profitable to go over the difficulties well,” we, as inquirers, undergo transformations in our 
appetitive structuration. Habituated to desiring ends as final resting points, we are opened to the labile desire 
for ends in their potential inexhaustibility and the satisfactions incumbent thereto.
17 Tarrying with Aristotle, we 
find that it may be to our profit to lay down our regular calculations wherein we can only accept as profitable 
that which is unequivocally and immediately so, that which fulfills a need defined in advance, and instead open 
to the possibility of an indefinitely deferred profit whose pursuit may be, para -doxically, profit to the highest 
degree. In going over the difficulties well, we inscribe hesitation as a condition for the success of our inquiries, 
inquiries so often characterized by over-great haste. Our desire for knowledge, perhaps due to our pleasure in 
“having seen,” leads all too often to a rush for conclusions rather than a careful, hesitant approach to answers 
in many ways. Rather than returning to the inception of our inquiries and considering other, perhaps more 
fecund trajectories, we become enamored with the fruits of our inquiries and hold fast to them. Perhaps, 
returning to the issue of what it is to “succeed well in arriving at answers,” success well arrived at is not a 
condition wherein all the relevant, pre-defined questions have been correlated with their “answers,” but rather 
a  condition  wherein  the  texture  of  answering  becomes  a  responsiveness  to  the  questions  posed,  a 
responsiveness in which the answer’s determinacy is in proportion to the determinacy of the question. This is 
perhaps the way in which aporias belong to their ends. When specific sets of questions posed are correlated 
with answers—such as “it is not impossible that …” or “it may be the case and is not inconsistent that …” or 
“such and such a thought does not run into the problems that our predecessors run into,” or “from our 
inquiries we cannot conclude otherwise”—that are responsive to the quality of the questions, perhaps another 
mode of answering is at stake than that to which we are accustomed, and perhaps this mode of answering is 
inextricable from the attainment of knowledge to the highest degree. The cultivation of habits of answering, 
then, may be understood as a cultivation of proportional responsiveness, that is, as an ethical matter, an issue 
of justice.  
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The difficulties raised by thought about its object reveal this fact: insofar as thought is in difficulties, it 
is like those who are bound; and in both cases one cannot go forward. (995a 30-34) 
 
“Insofar as thought is in difficulties [aporias],” although one may not go forward, although one may be 
bound to aporias and the (in)determinacies of inquiry implied thereby, movement is not altogether paralyzed. 
Rather, in certain cases, the binding of thought, like the binding of limbs, hinders movement in some ways 
while focusing it in others.
18 Perhaps the aporetic bonds of thought, far from implying a simple paralysis, 
enable the concentration of thought in ways that would remain neglected given a more full range of motion. In 
the midst of our hasty rushing toward conclusions, perhaps it is the binding of thought to aporias that allows 
for  the development  of an  even  approximately  sufficient  clarification  of the  problems  requisite  for  an 
investigation  into  the  science  of  wisdom.  Although  thought  remains  ensnared  by  “the  difficulties,”  perhaps 
beholden to the irreducible status of its aporetic beginnings, although thought may be prevented from an 
unabashedly forward motion, to be sure, forward is not the only relevant motion—especially with regard to 
inquiry.  
“The difficulties” [aporias], we should note, are “raised by thought about its object,” which is to say, these 
difficulties are products of thought internal to the attempt to articulate its object to the greatest extent. What 
stands revealed when “thought is in difficulties” is not only that “like those who are bound . . . one cannot go 
forward,”  but  also  that  the  difficulties  impeding  uninhibited  progression  are  “raised  by  thought.”
19 
Paradoxically, the striving for utmost clarity gives rise to difficulties that require the project of clarification to 
focus on delimiting as precisely as possible the obstinate opacity of these difficulties. The aspiration for clarity, to 
remain true to its course, must swerve into its obverse: the precise clarification of concealment as concealment 
and opaqueness as opaqueness to the highest degree. The attempt to articulate the object of thought to the 
highest  degree,  paradoxically,  suffuses  thought  with  aporias  and  binds  it  to  the  study  of  those  aporias. 
Compounding the paradox to the point of irony, the aporias internal to the attempt to specify the object of 
thought  to  the  greatest  extent  may  be  understood  as  at  once  liberatory  and  binding  (in  aporetic 
appropriateness, as liberatory shackles); for, thought’s self-binding to the specification of aporias consequent 
upon its commitment to clarification of its object to the highest degree appears as a mode of constraint that 
produces possibilities for thought that would likely remain suppressed by our habitual freedoms. Were thought 
able to simply gloss over the aporias to which it gives rise, were we to hastily march though problems on the 
way to exhaustive conclusions, thought, bereft of crucial opportunities for thinking the aporetic status of its 
objects, would remain precluded from determining its objects to the highest degree if doing so entails thinking 
the object  as aporetic. Difficulties, although they may hinder a simply forward trajectory, open up lines of 
inquiry that structure our investigative topography and perhaps thereby facilitate investigative successes in 
their own way. 
                                                 
    
18  Cf. Stephen Shainberg’s (2002) Secretary. 
    
19 Such thought, to be sure, is itself beholden to phenomena and thus the  difficulties are decidedly emergent 
from phenomena. Glossator, Volume 1, Fall 2009                                                                                                                         glossator.org 
 
ISSN 1942-3381                                                              Adam Rosen 
 
141 
Insofar as “thought is like those who are bound,” insofar as thought is attuned and responsive to 
aporias, a hasty rush forward is thereby hindered, and thought, emancipated by shackling, is allowed to be 
thoughtful all the more. Constraint becomes evident as a condition for self-actualization (once again). Binding 
may thus operate as a transfixed rapture, as an erotically charged attuning to the complexities of an object of 
inquiry, as a force liberating the energies of thought that become free to pervade their objects again and again. 
Directed inquiry here shades into reverie without regression, or at least this is the hope. Freed from the need to 
think only toward an exhaustive conclusion, liberated from the project of self-annihilation whereby thought 
dissolves in resolving its problems, thought, attentive to the aporias to which it is bound (perhaps attentive to 
such a degree that it is able to distinguish between problems that admit of a more thorough resolution and 
those that may not) is allowed to seek the greatest degree of specification of its objects. This would be the case 
even more so if the highest determination of the object of inquiry consists in its being spoken in many ways, 
that is, if the polysemic determinations of an object are intrinsic to its being articulated to the highest degree. 
However,  aporias  also  impose  limitations.  Too  extreme  a  focus  on  a  particular  aporia  or  on  the 
aporetic status of a particular object or range of objects, and all the more so, too extreme a focus on the 
aporetic  dimensions  of  objects  as  such  or  the  aporetic  nature  of  inquiry  may  hinder  progress  in  other 
directions. We are thus left to wonder: when is attunement to the aporias “raised by thought about its object” 
superfluous, or even worse, a mode of resistance to further developments and clarification there where they are 
possible, a hasty preclusion of the capacity “to go forward” when such a forward momentum is precisely what 
the inquiry requires? When is careful attention to the aporetic dimension of a particular investigation or to that 
of the general horizon of inquiry a mode of superficial stasis that forecloses careful consideration of issues 
looming  on  the  horizon?  Might  over-enamored  attention  to  aporias  collude  with  various  resistances  to 
investigative progress? Might lavishing attention on the aporetic conspire with defenses against the contingent 
difficulties of working through and moving on? At this level of generality, all that can be said is that the 
productive  and/or  destructive  status  of  attention  to  aporias  remains,  appropriately  enough,  undecided  in 
advance, in its own way aporetic. We can not say for sure, once and for all, if aporias are on-balance helpful or 
harmful  for  thought.  Attuned  to  aporias,  thought  seems  both  constrained  and  liberated.  “One  cannot  go 
forward,”  but  thought  is  nonetheless  very  much  concerned  with  its  object.  On  the  other  hand,  perhaps 
contextualization would allow for more refined judgment. 
 
Accordingly one should study all the difficulties both for the purposes stated and because those 
who inquire without first going over the difficulties are like those who are ignorant of where they 
must go. (995a34-36) 
 
“One should study all the difficulties” “for the proposes stated,” that is, because (1) “answers successfully 
arrived at are solutions to difficulties previously discussed,” (2) it is necessary that “we must first state the problems 
which should be discussed first,” and (3) insofar as thought remains simply in difficulties, which is to say, 
wrapped up in aporias without generating any further determinacies or productive questions, “one cannot go 
forward” with the inquiry. “One should study all the difficulties”: does this imperative not resist fulfillment? 
For how can one study all the difficulties if one is only beginning to inquire and is thus profoundly unaware of 
what the relevant difficulties are, let alone the proper order of their statement and discussion. If this account of Glossator, Volume 1, Fall 2009                                                                                                                         glossator.org 
 
ISSN 1942-3381                                                              Adam Rosen 
 
142 
the developments of Beta One is not wholly off target, appealing to Aristotle as an authoritative guide is not 
sure to resolve the difficulty. Since “those who inquire without first going over the difficulties,” that is, all the 
difficulties, “are like those who are ignorant of where they must go,”
20 it seems that, if Aristotle’s pedagogical 
practice is anything like what was sketched above, we will remain forever uncertain of the proper topography 
and trajectory of our investigation, consigned to dwell between ignorance and wisdom. It seems that we will 
remain liminal beings wondering whether we are being lead toward a specification of the science of wisdom to 
the highest degree or not. Recall that, as a matter of contingency or structural necessity, we may “overlook” 
the determination and study of one or more difficulty and thus deviate from the proper course, if there is one, 
from the beginning.  
Consequently, the stakes of the question of to what extent we are to allow thought to tarry with any 
particular aporia are significantly raised. If “one should study all the difficulties” it is unclear whether that 
requires thought to “first go over the difficulties” in a careful although somewhat casual manner or rather “study 
all the difficulties” in a much more sustained engagement. Aristotle’s habit in  The Metaphysics of variously 
leaving and coming back to the same problem time and again is highly suggestive in this context. It remains 
quite indeterminate whether thought should be pushed from aproia to aporia in order to attain a synoptic view 
of all the relevant aporias of an inquiry (assuming that one’s sense of relevance is absolutely astute from the 
beginning) or whether refusing to push thought beyond the aporia to which it is currently attuned until one is 
thoroughly satisfied—given that what seems to be a single aporia may resolve into many—is the only hope for 
the discernment of all the aporias relevant for the inquiry.
21 And even then, what sense of satisfaction would 
guarantee that the aporia is fully worked through, if there is such a thing as a thoroughgoing working through 
of an aporia? The tension is between the need for a survey that lays the ground for study and the need for 
study which determines the field to be surveyed.  
Perhaps, given the seemingly irreducible ambivalences—the aporias—of the mandate to “study all the 
difficulties,” it may be that to “study all the difficulties” requires more than one effort, and not just a two-track 
inquiry by a single inquirer. Perhaps what is required is a differential return to and development of the aporias 
structuring the inquiry, and perhaps this is connected with the illimitability of the community of the aporia.  
 
. . . besides, such persons do not even know whether they have found or not what they are 
seeking, for the end is not clear to them, but it is clear to those who have first gone over the 
difficulties. (995b1-3) 
 
Sure enough, if one has not studied or at least “first gone over” all the aporias, “the end is not clear.” 
But who has “first gone over [all] the difficulties” such that the end is clear? Is this to suggest that Aristotle, 
impelled by a force of necessity emergent from his unqualifiedly successful inquiry into the science of wisdom, 
has “gone over the difficulties” in their entirety, or at least to a sufficient degree? What in the character of his 
investigative performance would suggest this? If we are not to attribute an uncharacteristically hubristic tenor 
to Aristotle’s intimation of investigative success, it may be best to understand that claim to “have first gone 
                                                 
    
20 Concerning our status between ignorance and wisdom, compare Symposium 201dff. 
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over the difficulties” such that “the end is . . . clear” as involving not the secure knowledge of the issues which, 
once  known  fully,  amount  to  wisdom  to  the  highest  degree,  but  rather  involving  clarity  concerning  the 
incessant task, the interminable, recursive end of the investigation into the science of wisdom. Is the clarity we 
seek clarity enough to locate that which would constitute the end of our inquiry or is it perhaps the clarity of 
the self-reflective realization that we cannot “even know whether  . . . [we] have found or not what  . . . [we] are 
seeking,” that is, clarity concerning the difficulties of our condition? Taking the latter option seriously, it may 
be that, perhaps surprisingly, a form of self-knowledge is, in part, the end of the inquiry into the science of 
wisdom. Perhaps for those who have “gone over the difficulties” so as to become as clear as possible about 
their objects of inquiry, for those who attempt as much as possible to study all of the difficulties in the right 
order, success in arriving at the end names an affirmative appetitive comportment toward the interminability of 
the investigation. Over against the founding prejudice of those who “do not even know whether they have 
found or not what they are seeking” precisely as a result of their conviction that they are seeking an exhaustive 
determination of the aporias structuring the inquiry into the science of wisdom, perhaps “the end” is only clear, 
to the extent that it can become clear, in its indefinite deferral, which is to say, in its partial, ongoing obscurity. 
Even if so, is this the only end of the inquiry into the science of wisdom? Isn’t the end, or at least an end, the 
determination of the primary mover to the highest degree? The end, whatever it may be, is, although necessary 
(or so Aristotle avers), apparently unverifiable: at the limit, a question. Such an end thus appears to be more of 
a methodological postulation in the service of an ethical and investigative project than the finality of totalized 
knowledge.  
 
Further, one who has heard all the arguments, like the one who has heard both parties in a 
lawsuit or both sides of a dispute, is necessarily in a better position to judge truly. (995b3-4) 
 
“One who has heard all the arguments,” presumably analogous to the one who has studied and/or 
“first gone over” all the difficulties, in fact, has not heard the totality of arguments. “One who has heard all the 
arguments” is rather “like the one who has head both parties in a lawsuit,” that is, like one who has heard the 
sides admissible by the standards of the particular juridical apparatus. “Both parties in a lawsuit” may not be 
the totality of those involved in the issue at hand; for, to give an example from Aristotle’s day, slaves, women, 
children, and foreigners (except under highly restricted conditions) were not admitted as parties in lawsuits. 
“One who has heard both parties in a lawsuit” is not “one who has heard all the arguments,” but rather all of 
the arguments admissible. Similarly, “the one who has head both . . . sides of a dispute” may not have “heard 
all the arguments,” for there may be more sides to the issue than are admitted by conventions of conversation 
(think here of Aristotle’s failure to enter into dialogue with women when developing his treatises on sexual 
difference), and especially disputation. Or there may be some parts of an argument left unspoken for various 
strategic, ethical, or other reasons. “One who has heard all the arguments” and presumably by analogical 
extension, one who has studied “all the difficulties,” is not one with unimpeachable access to a systematically 
complete totality but rather one who is acquainted with a contextually relevant whole. Those acquainted with 
all arguments (or aporias) in this sense end up (that is, arrive at a limit) not with methodically guaranteed 
certainty, not with definitive and final answers, but “in a better position to judge,” perhaps in a “better position 
to judge truly.”  Glossator, Volume 1, Fall 2009                                                                                                                         glossator.org 
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As should be clear: 
 
Concerning all these problems, not only is it difficult to arrive at the truth, but it is not even 
easy to discuss the problems well. (995b4-5) 
 